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Contemporary Mathematics
Opaque predicates, veiled sets and their logic
De´cio Krause and Steven French
Abstract. Motivated by considerations in the foundations of quantum me-
chanics and inspired by the literature on vague predicates, we introduce the
concept of an opaque predicate. While in the case of vague predicates there is
a kind of indeterminacy with respect to the predicate, in the sense that the
vagueness concerns whether a well-determined object satisfies it or not, in the
case of opaque predicates the indeterminacy is with regard to the objects which
should satisfy them. In other words, their extensions are not well-defined, de-
spite the fact that the conditions for an object to satisfy the predicates are
well-known. We suggest that such opaque predicates (and more generally,
what we call opaque relations) can be characterized by a logic which encom-
passes a semantics founded in quasi-set theory, and call their extensions veiled
sets.
1. Vagueness and Opacity
“Vagueness is a feature of scientific as of other
discourse.”
Max Black (1966)
Peirce famously characterised vagueness in the following terms: “A proposition
is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically
uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have
regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically uncertain
we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but
because the speaker’s habits of language were indeterminate” [29].
In this context, two issues immediately arise: (i) whether vagueness can be
dismissed as merely a feature of ‘natural’ language which will effectively evaporate
with the introduction of some formal system, and (ii) given a negative answer to
(i), whether vagueness requires the use of some form of non-classical logic. These
are the issues with which standard discussions of vagueness have been concerned.
Thus Wright, for example, emphasises that vague predicates lack ‘sharp boundaries’
and argues forcefully that “... the utility and point of the classifications expressed
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by many vague predicates would be frustrated if they were supplied with sharp
boundaries” [39, p. 227]. In his own terms, the most ‘profound’ example he
gives is that of colour predicates, where the elimination of vagueness would incur
the price of jeopardising contact between language and empirical reality. Thus,
vagueness is a phenomenon of ‘semantic depth’, in the sense that “[i]t is not usually
a matter simply of our lacking an instruction where to ‘draw the line’; rather the
instructions we already have determine that the line is not to be drawn” [ibid.].
However, if ‘the line is not to be drawn’, then clearly classical logic is not to be
used. Following Putnam [32], Mott has recently suggested that vague predicates
can be accommodated within intuitionistic logic if they are taken to be partial, in
precisely the above sense; that is, in certain situations, their application simply
cannot be decided at all [27]. Thus, the application of a colour predicate can
be decided simply by using our sense organs, in those situations where it can be
decided at all and it is precisely because of the existence of the complement of such
situations that the predicate can be termed ‘vague’. At the end of his paper Mott
suggests that intuitionistic mathematics might be the appropriate framework for
quantum physics, noting that “[i]f sometimes there really is no fact of the matter
whether a certain object is a table, or a certain shade is red, or a certain man bald,
then perhaps sometimes there is no fact of the matter exactly where an electron is
either” [ibid., p. 147].
However, to talk of there being no fact of the matter as to the location of an
electron is to assume that one is talking about a well-defined individual, such that
the application of the predicate regarding its location cannot be determined. As
we have indicated elsewhere, this is certainly one way of considering the quantum
situation ([26], [16], [18]). Nevertheless, our approach here is different and has not
to our knowledge been explored in the literature. Quantum particles may also be
regarded as ‘non-individuals’ in a certain sense [31] (see [14], [24]) and now the
issues shifts from the applicability of the predicates to the determinateness of the
objects. It is this which marks the difference between vagueness and what we shall
call opacity. With regard to the latter, it is not an issue of the predicate lacking
‘sharp boundaries’ but rather of the objects to which the predicate applies lacking
individuality. In the case of opaqueness, then, the grounds for dismissing it as an
aspect of natural language are even weaker than the case of vagueness. We would
like to emphasise this point: if what quantum mechanics tells us about how the
world could be1 is taken seriously, as we think it should be, then, in the sense
delineated here, this ‘world’ is opaque (cf. M. Black who argues for an analysis
of vagueness in order to avoid the “wholesale destruction of the formal sciences”
[1, p. 27]). Granted this, a completely different formal framework is required to
capture this opacity –one which includes both syntactic and semantic elements. It
is precisely such a framework that we sketch below.
From a more mathematical point of view, vague predicates are considered to
differ from the usual ‘Fregean’ predicates ([37]) in the following sense. A unary
predicate letter P of (say) a first-order language is Fregean if it provides a bipartition
on a domain D of objects to which the language makes reference. In other words,
there exist D1 and D2 such that D1 ∩D2 = ∅ , D1 ∪D2 = D and D1 = {x ∈ D :
P (x)} 6= ∅.
1We have chosen this formulation as neutral between the claims of realist and anti-realist;
see [38], for example.
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The set D1 is the extension of P and if a ∈ D1, we say that ‘a has the property
P ’; otherwise, that is, if a ∈ D2, we say that ‘a does not have the property P ’.
Vague predicates are then characterized as those predicates which do not provide
such a bipartition in the domain. In other words, there are objects a ∈ D such that
neither a ∈ D1 nor a ∈ D2 holds. For these objects, it is ‘vague’ whether they have
or not have the property ascribed by P .
The idea of vagueness provided by such an analysis, we emphazise, is concerned
with the vagueness of the predicates involved, and not with the objects the language
is making reference to. In fact, if we consider if a certain (well-determined) person,
who could be classified as a philosopher, is or is not a profound thinker, then it may
be vague whether he/she is profound or not, since the criteria for ‘profundity’ is
vague. The same occurs with ‘tall’, ‘intelligent’ and so on. Returning to quantum
mechanics, there are situations which simply cannot be characterized in terms of
‘vagueness’ in the above sense. We prefer to classify these cases in another fashion
and call the predicates involved opaque. The following example, we hope, reinforces
what was said above. Suppose we are dealing with a collection of n electrons and
that we intend to measure their spin in a certain chosen direction. In other words,
we might consider the predicate ‘to have spin up in the (chosen) direction’. It is
known that physicists are able to specify precisely what conditions electrons must
obey in order to satisfy the predicate, hence the situation is not one concerning
vagueness in the sense explained above. However, physicists have no means to
determine which are the electrons of the aggregate that have spin up in the given
direction. In fact, it turns out that there may bem electrons (m < n), say, with spin
up in that direction, but if another measurement is made, despite finding the same
number m of electrons with spin up in the considered direction, there is no way of
assuring that both collections coincide; that is, we have no grounds for asserting
that the electrons of this last collection are ‘the same’ as those of the former. There
is a strong indeterminacy here concerning the objects of such collections, and this
is one of the basic metaphysical interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Another example might be the following: Suppose we are considering the six
electrons there are in the level 2p of a sodium atom. All the electrons coincide with
respect to all their quantum numbers, so there is no way of distinguishing them.
Even so, physicists reason as if there are six ‘entities’ (it is difficult to use the word
‘individuals’ in this case —see [36]) in that level. Then consider the predicate ‘to
be one of the electrons of the level 2p of a sodium atom’. How may we ascribe to
this predicate a well-defined extension? This is not possible without ambiguity.
Situations of this sort, in which the indeterminacy resides not with the pred-
icate, but with the individuals instead, motivates our discussion on opaque predi-
cates. The question to be answered now concerns the mathematical treatment of
these entities.
2. A logic with opaque predicates
The basic intuitive idea of a logical system encompassing opaque predicates is
that for such a predicates, their extensions cannot be defined as standard sets since
such a set (Menge) is, according to the well known ‘definition’ coined by Cantor,
“any collection into a whole of definite and separate objects of our intuition or of
our thought” [3, p. 85]. In accordance with what we have said above, the goal is
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to represent the idea that it is not possible to distinguish (that is, to ‘separate’) in
a strong sense between the individuals that satisfy the predicate.
Our strategy will be as follows. We intend to characterize as opaque those
predicates whose extension is a collection of objects (technically, a quasi-set) whose
elements cannot be distinguished from one another. The problem is that, if we
consider the predicates of a certain language, say a first-order language, we have
no criteria for distinguishing among those predicates which should be considered as
opaque. The system described below permits a clear definition of opaque predicates
in accordance with the above motivations. The reasons to use such a logic will be
explained in the last section.
In what follows we present the main features of the logic Lop, which is a slight
modified version of the system Sω presented in [6]. Let us begin by defining the
concept of type: we call Π the set of types , recursively defined as being the smallest
set such that: (a) e1, e2 ∈ Π, and (b) if τ1, . . . , τn ∈ Π, then 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 ∈ Π.
e1 and e2 are the types of the individuals; the objects of type e1 are called ‘m-
objects’ (short for ‘microobjects’) and may be intuitively thought of as elementary
particles of modern physics as in the example of opacity we have described in the
previous section. The objects of type e2 are such that classical logic applies to them
in all its aspects.
In more precise words, Lop is a higher-order logic whose language has the
following categories of primitive symbols: connectives: ¬ and → (∧, ∨ and ↔ are
introduced as usual), the universal quantifier ∀ (∃ is defined in the standard way),
parentheses and comma. With respect to variables and constants, for each type
τ ∈ Π there exists a denumerably infinite collection of variables Xτ1 , X
τ
2 , . . . of type
τ and a (possibly empty) set of constants Aτ1 , A
τ
2 , . . . of that type; we use X
τ , Y τ
and Cτ , Dτ perhaps with subscripts as metavariables for variables and constants
of type τ respectively.
The terms of type τ are the variables and the constants of that type; so, we have
individual terms of type e1 and of type e2. We use U
τ , V τ , perhaps with subscripts,
as syntactical variables for terms of type τ . The atomic formulas are defined in the
usual way: if U τ is a term of type τ = 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 and U τ1 , . . . , U τn are terms of
types τ1, . . . , τn respectively, then U
τ (U τ1 , . . . , U τn) is an atomic formula. Other
formulas are defined as in a standard way.
The postulates of Lop (axiom schemata and inference rules) are the following:
(A1): A, where A comes from a tautology in ¬ and→ by uniform substitution
of formulas of Lop for the variables.
(A2): ∀Xτ (A→ B)→ (A→ ∀XτB), where Xτ does not occur free in A.
(A3): ∀XτA(Xτ )→ A(U τ ) where U τ is a term free for Xτ in A(Xτ ) and of
the same type of Xτ .
(R1): From A and A→ B to infer B
(R2): From A to infer ∀XτA
The syntactical concepts of free and bound occurences of a variable in a term
or in a formula, such as those of sentence (closed formula), theorem, consistent set
of formulas, etc. can be defined without difficulty. The logic Lop still encompasses
a comprehension axiom, which can be stated as follows:
If U τ (Xτ1 , . . . , Xτn) is a formula in which the variables Xτ1 , . . . , Xτn are free
and if Xτi is a predicate of type τ = 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉, then
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(A4): ∃Xτi ∀X
τ1, . . . , ∀Xτn(Xτi (X
τ1, . . . , Xτn)↔ U τ (Xτ1 , . . . , Xτn))
The concept of identity is introduced for all objects except those denoted by
terms of type e1. This justifies the distinction we considered between the types
of the individuals. The idea conforms itself with Schro¨dinger’s (see also [2, pp.
27–29], [19, pp. 49–51]), who said that the concept of identity does not make sense
for the elementary particles of modern physics [34, pp. 17–18], [6]. The definition
is briefly stated as follows:
Definition 2.1. If τ 6= e1, then:
U τ = V τ ⇐⇒ ∀X〈τ〉(X〈τ〉(U τ )↔ X〈τ〉(V τ ))
Then our logic characterizes also in a syntactical way a certain category of
objects (namely, those denoted by the terms of type e1) about which we cannot
say either that they are identical or that they are distinct. These objects play the
role of those objects whose aggregates are intended to constitute the extensions of
the opaque predicates. In this sense, we can introduce in a more precise way the
following definition of what is to be understood by an opaque relation:
Definition 2.2. An opaque relation is any term U τ of type τ = 〈τ1, . . . τn〉
where every τi is obtained recursively from e1 (that is, for every i, τi is e1 itself, or
〈e1〉, or 〈〈e1〉〉, or 〈e1, e1〉 and so on).
It must be realized that we do not intend to enter here into the familiar discus-
sion on what is to be considerd as a ‘predicate’. We simply use a logical terminology
and call a ‘predicate’ an unary relation of type 〈i〉, where i is e1 or e2. Then, opaque
predicates are particular cases of the opaque relations expressed by the above defi-
nition.
The problem, as we will recall in the beginning of the next section, is to find
an adequate way of interpreting these predicates, since it would make no sense to
ascribe a set , that is, a collection of distinguishable objects, as the extension of
such predicates.
We can add axioms of extensionality and infinity in the standard way to our
logic by adapting those of [20, Chap. 4]. Let us mention here only the case of the
axiom of choice, which might be thought as problematic due to the senselessness
of the concept of identity regarding the objects of type e1. We may use a weaker
form which covers only those situations in which there are no objects of type e1
involved, which can be adapted from that presented in [20, p. 156]. More precisely,
if Xτ11 and X
τ1
2 are variables such that τ1 6= e1, Y
τ2
1 and 2
τ1
2 are variables such that
τ2 6= e1, Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
1 and Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
2 are also variables, then the axiom is:
∀Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
1 ∃Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
2 (∀X
τ1
1 (∃Y
τ2
1 (Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
1 (X
τ1
1 , Y
τ2
1 )→
∃Y τ21 (Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
2 (X
τ1
1 , Y
τ2
1 ) ∧ Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
1 (X
τ1
1 , Y
τ2
1 )))→
∀Xτ11 ∀X
τ1
2 ∀Y
τ1
1 ∀Y
τ1
2 (Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
2 (X
τ1
1 , Y
τ2
1 ) ∧ Z
〈τ1,τ2〉
2 (X
τ1
1 , Y
τ2
2 )→ Y
τ2
1 = Y
τ2
2 ))
Other usual syntactical notions are defined in the standard way, such as for
instance the concept of ⊢ A, Γ ⊢ A for a set Γ of sentences, and so on.
Now let us consider the semantical counterpart of our logic.
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3. Semantics
3.1. The mathematical framework. Let us recall once more that within
the scope of the logic Lop, we can consider objects for which there is no meaning
in talking about either their identity or their diversity. But, when we consider the
semantical aspects of such a logic, in the sense of an association of certain objects
of a mathematical structure to the terms of the language, it is convenient that such
a procedure should reflect the intuitive aspects of the logic. Hence, it is convenient
that the terms of type e1 (those to which the usual concept of identity cannot be
applied) should not have a well-defined interpretation. In fact, if we ascribe to the
constants of the type e1 well-determined individuals of the domain (elements of
a set, say, as in the usual semantics), since to the elements of a set the relation
of equality makes sense, we are leaving aside the basic idea we intend to capture,
namely, that of the ‘non-individuality’ of certain elements. So, a ‘natural’ semantics
for our logic should be presented by using a mathematical device in which we can
talk about objects that cannot be individualized, that is, strongly indistinguishable
objects.2
In other words, we are not acting in conformity with the intuitive aspects we
intend to capture if we use standard set theory to build the mathematical structure
in which the language of Lop is to be interpreted. Thus, instead of using a set
theory like Zermelo-Fraenkel in the metamathematics, we use the quasi-set theory
Q (for details, see [23]).3
Roughly speaking, the theoryQ is a mathematical device for treating collection-
s of indistinguishable objects. The theory allows the presence of a certain kind of
Urelemente (the so called m-atoms) to which the usual concept of identity does not
apply. The underlying logic of Q is classical quantificational logic without identity;
the specific symbols are three unary predicate letters m(x) (read ‘x is an m-atom’),
M(x) (read ‘x is an M -atom’ –that is, a standard Urelement) and Z(x) (read ‘x is
a standard set’). Such ‘sets’ are characterized in Q as quasi-sets whose transitive
closure do not contain m-atoms). Furthermore, the language still encompasses two
binary predicate symbols ∈ (membership) and ≡ (indistinguishability) and a unary
functional symbol qc (quasi-cardinality). A quasi-set (qset for short) is defined as
an entity which is not an Urelement (that is, it is anything that is neither an m-
atom nor a classical atom). We write Q(x) for saying that x is a quasi-set. The
concept of quasi-cardinal is introduced in such a way that it extends the concept
of cardinal for arbitrary qsets; some additional remarks on this concept shall be
mentioned below.
The axioms of indistinguishability state that ≡ has the properties of an equiva-
lence relation. The extensional equality =E is defined in the following way: x =E y
iff (Q(x) ∧ Q(y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)) ∨ (M(x) ∧ M(y) ∧ x ≡ y). That is, in
2In classical logic and mathematics, the concept of ‘indistinguishability’ cannot be separated
from that of ‘identity’ by force of Leibniz’ Law. This ‘identification’ of identity and indistinguisha-
bility (agreement with respect to properties), let us recall, is in the core of Ramsey’s criticism of
the treatment of identity presented in Principia Mathematica (vis., Leibniz’ Law). In a certain
sense, our logics vindicate Ramsey’s claim that “There is nothing self-contradictory (. . . ) in a and
b [where a 6= b] having all their elementary properties in common. Hence, since this is logically
possible, it is essential to have a symbolism which allows us to consider this possibility and does
not exclude it by definition” [33, p. 182].
3As explained in that work, there have been presented several versions of quasi-set theory
(in reality, they constitute distinct theories; see our references).
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extensional entities are indistinguishable standard Urelemente or qsets which have
‘exactly the same’ elements. It can be proven that the extensional equality has
all the formal properties of classical identity.4 The substitutivity principle is valid
only with respect to indistinguishable objects which are not m-atoms. In symbols,
∀x∀y(¬m(x)∧¬m(y) → (x ≡ y → (A(x, x)→ A(x, y)))) with the usual syntactical
restrictions. Furthermore, the axioms for the concept of quasi-cardinal generalize
the concept of cardinal for arbitrary qsets. Since the identity relation cannot be
applied to (a pair of) m-atoms and since it is postulated that every qset has a
quasi-cardinal, then there is a precise sense in saying that the objects of a qset
whose elements are indistinguishable m-atoms can only be aggregated in certain
quantities, but that they cannot be ordered or counted.5
One of the most peculiar axioms of Q is the ‘weak’ axiom of extensionality,
which states that qsets having ‘the same quantity of elements of the same sort’
are indistinguishable qsets (this idea can be stated conveniently by means of the
concept of quasi-cardinal and by passing the quotient by the relation of indistin-
guishability). Among other things, this axiom permits us to prove an interesting
result, which we call ‘the theorem of the unobservability of permutations’ [24, 23]:
if in a qset we exchange one m-atom by an indistinguishable one, then the resulting
qset is indistinguishable from the original qset. This can be viewed as the formal
counterpart of the unobservability of particle permutations in quantum mechan-
ics.6 Important qsets for our purposes here are the ‘pure’ qsets, that is, those qsets
whose elements are m-atoms only. Certain particular pure qsets will be taken to
be the extensions of the opaque predicates of the logic Lop, as we will see below.
Furthermore, it is convenient to recall that Q involves standard mathematics,
in the sense that all axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory may be suitably trans-
lated into the language of quasi-sets and (these translations) proven as theorems
of Q;7 so, all the set-theoretical operations (union, cartesian products, difference
between quasi-sets, etc.) can be performed in Q similarly as in standard set theory;
consequently, we don’t need to pay attention here to the terminology, which is used
as in the standard set theories.
Let us still mention in brief about an axiom which states that qc(P (x)) = 2qc(x),
where P (x) is the quasi-set of all the subquasi-sets of x (defined in the usual way).
Here, 2qc(x) may be understood as follows. If α is the cardinal which is the quasi-
cardinal of x,8 then 2qc(x) is card(α2), that is, the cardinal of the collection (which
is a ‘set’) of all functions from α to 2 = {0, 1}.9 It should also be realised that since
4Hence, by ‘indistinguishable standard Urelemente’, as in the last phrase, we understand
‘identical Urelemente’. From now on, we will use ‘=’ instead of ‘=E ’.
5Then the m-atoms have some of the characteristics generally attributed to quanta. See [36].
6The concept of ‘one’ m-atom can be made precise by using the ‘strong singleton’ of an
m-atom. More precisely, the strong singleton of x is a qset which is a subqset (in the usual sense)
of the qset of all the objects indistinguishable from x (this qset is provided by an axiom like
the pair axiom of ZFC, but using the indistinguishability relation instead of equality) which has
quasi-cardinal 1. In Q, we can prove that such a qset exists.
7For further information on this particular topic, see for instance [22, 8, 23].
8Another axiom says that every quasi-set has an unique quasi-cardinal which is a cardinal
defined in the ‘classical’ part of Q. So, the quasi-cardinals are ‘sets’ in Q, obeying the standard
axioms of ZF set theory.
9The standard concept of ‘function’ may also be restricted in Q, since an usual mapping in
general cannot distinguish between m-atoms which are in the relation ≡. So, the concept of func-
tion was extended to a concept of quasi-function, which intuitively speaking maps indistinguish-
able objects in indistinguishable objects. When these objects are ‘classical’, the quasi-functions
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both α and 2 are ‘classical’ objects (in the sense that they obey the axioms of ZF),
then α2 is also a ‘set’ and hence the definition of card(α2) makes sense.
This axiom has an important consequence. As suggested above, in Q there may
exist qsets whose elements are m-atoms only, called ‘pure’ qsets. Furthermore, it
may be the case that the m-atoms of a pure qset x are indistinguishable from one
another, in the sense of sharing the indistinguishability relation ≡. In this case, the
axioms provide the grounds for saying that nothing in the theory can distinguish
among the elements of x. But, then one could ask what is it that sustains the idea
that there is more than one entity in x. The answer is obtained through the above
mentioned axioms (among others, of course). Since the quasi-cardinal of the power
qset of x has quasi-cardinal 2qc(x), then if qc(x) = α, it results that for every quasi-
cardinal β ≤ α there exists a subquasi-set y ⊆ x such that qc(y) = β, according
to the remaining axioms about the quasi-cardinality of the subquasi-sets. Thus, if
qc(x) = α 6= 0, the axioms do not forbid the existence of α subquasi-sets of x which
can be regarded as ‘singletons’.
Of course the theory cannot prove that these ‘unitary’ subquasi-sets (suppos-
ing now that qc(x) ≥ 2) are distinct, since we have no way of ‘identifying’ their
elements. These ‘singletons’ are indistinguishable in the sense of the axiom of
weak extensionality. But what is important is that quasi-set theory is compatible
with the existence of distinct and abosolutely indistinguishable m-atoms. This is
important, for example, for obtaining a description of quantum statistics in the
framework of Q (see [25] for details on this point). In other words, it is consistent
with Q to maintain that x has α elements, which may be regarded as absolutely
indistinguishable objects. Since the elements of x may share the relation ≡, they
may be further understood as belonging to a same ‘equivalence class’ (for instance,
being indistinguishable electrons) but in such a way that we cannot assert either
that they are identical or that they are distinct from one another (i.e., they act as
‘identical electrons’ in the physicist’s jargon).10
3.2. The Generalized Semantics of Lop. All the developments of this sec-
tion are performed in the quasi-set theory Q. We will not provide here all the
details but only the main definitions and results, which are similar to those of clas-
sical logic (see for instance [4]). The proofs can be adapted without difficulty from
the most general case of Scho¨dinger logics presented in [7].
We call L the language of Lop. Let D be a quasi-set such that D = m ∪M
where m is a pure qset whose elements are indistinguishable from one another and
M is a non-empty set (in Q).
By a frame for L based on D we mean a quasi-function M whose domain in
the set Π of types such that:
1. M(e1) = m
2. M(e2) =M
3. For each type τ = 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 ∈ Π, M(k) ⊆ P(Mτ1 ,× . . . ×Mτn). If the
inclusion in this last expression can be replaced by (extensional) equality,
then the frame is standard .
turn out to be ‘functions’ in the standard sense. As remarked, all the details may be found in
[23].
10The application of this formalism to the concept of non-individual quantum particles has
been proposed in [24].
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If we write Mτ instead of M(τ), then the frame can be viewed as a family
(Mτ )τ∈Π of qsets satisfying the above conditions. In what follows, we will refer
indifferently to both this family and F = {X : ∃τ ∈ Π ∧ X = M(τ)} as the frame
for L based on D.
A denotation for L based on D is a quasi-function φ whose domain is the set
of constants of L, defined such that φ(Aτ ) ∈Mτ for every τ ∈ Π. So, in particular
φ(Ae1 ) ∈ m and φ(Ae2 ) ∈M .
Based on these definitions, we may introduce the concept of an interpretation
for L based on D as an ordered pair A = 〈(Mτ )τ∈Π, φ〉, where (Mτ )τ∈Π is a frame
for L (based on D) and φ a denotation as above. The interpretation is principal
if the frame is standard. It can be shown that the defined predicate of equality
(Definition 1.1) is interpreted in the quasi-set ∆≡(τ), the ‘pseudo-diagonal’ of Mτ ,
namely, the qset whose elements are pairs of indistinguishable objects (see [7]).
A valuation for L (based on D) is a quasi-function ψ whose domain is the
collection of terms of L and in such a way that ψ is the extension of the denotation
quasi-function φ to the whole set of terms of L. In other words, ψ is defined as
follows:
1. ψ(Aτ ) ≡ φ(Aτ ) for every constant Aτ . That is, the images of Aτ by φ and
by ψ are indistinguishable.
2. ψ(xe1 ) ∈ m
3. ψ(Xe2) ∈M
4. ψ(Xτ ) ∈Mτ for τ 6= e1, e2.
We introduce the concept of a formula A being satisfiable with respect to the
interpretation A (in symbols: A, ψ |= A) in accordance with the following clauses:
1. A, ψ |= U τ (Xτ1 , . . . , X
τ
n) iff 〈ψ(X
τ
1 ), . . . , ψ(X
τ
i )〉 ∈ ψ(U
τ ), where U τ is a
term of type 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 and X
τ
n are terms of type τi (i = 1, . . . , n).
2. The satisfaction clauses for ¬, → and ∀ are introduced as usual.
A formula A is true with respect to the interpretation A iff A, ψ |= A for every
valuation ψ with respect to A. An interpretationA is normal iff every instance of the
axioms of Lop is true in A, as are all instances of extensionality, separation, infinite
and choice. In what follows we will consider only appropriate interpretations.
A normal interpretation which is not principal is a secondary interpretation. A
formula A is valid iff it is true with respect to all principal interpretations, and it
is satisfiable if there exists a principal interpretation A and a valuation ψ such that
A, ψ |= A. The formula is secondarily valid if it is true with respect to all normal
interpretations, and it is secondarily satisfiable if is is true with respect to some
normal interpretation.
Then, by adapting the proofs presented in [4], we can state without difficulty
the following results: (1) A is valid iff ¬A is not satisfiable; (2) A is secondarily
valid iff ¬A is not secondarily satisfiable; (3) A is satisfiable iff ¬A is not valid;
(4) A is secondarily satisfiable iff ¬A is not secondarily valid and (5) A is valid
(respect. secondarily valid) with respect to a normal interpretation iff its universal
closure is valid (respect. secondarily valid) with respect to this interpretation (see
also [6]).
By a model of a set Γ of formulas of L we understand a normal interpretation A
such that A, ψ |= A for every formula A ∈ Γ. If A is a principal interpretation, we
talk of principal models , or of secondary models if A is a secondary interpretation.
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The following terminology will be used below: Γ |= A means that A holds in every
model of Γ, and |= A means that A is secondarily valid.
The proofs of the theorems below are simple adaptations from those of usual
higher-order logic [4], and we don’t think they must be repeated here. A particular
case of similar results involving quasi-set semantics was presented with more details
in [7].
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness). All theorems of Lop are secondarily valid.
In other words, ⊢ A implies |= A; it is not difficult to generalize this result:
Γ ⊢ A implies Γ |= A.
Theorem 3.2 (Lindenbaum). Every consistent set Γ of closed formulas of L
can be extended to a maximal consistent class Γ of closed formulas of L.11
Furthemore, there is the following important result:
Theorem 3.3. If A is a closed formula of L which is not a theorem, then there
exists a normal interpretation whose domains Mτ are denumerably infinite, with
respect to which ¬A is valid.
Then, based on these theorems, we can state the (weak) completeness theorem
for our logic, whose proof can be adapted either from [4] or [7].
Theorem 3.4 (Completeness). Every formula of Lop which is secondarily valid
is a theorem.
That is, |= A implies ⊢ A. In general, if Γ is a set of closed formulas of L which
is not inconsistent, then Γ |= A implies Γ ⊢ A, that is, if A holds in every model of
Γ, then A is derivable from the formulas of Γ.
4. Veiled Sets
Having sketched the main features of the generalized quasi-set semantics for
our logic, let us turn to a consideration of the opaque predicates and see more
carefully how they were interpreted in the framework of the previous section.
An opaque relation, according to our previous definiton, is a term of type 〈τ〉
where τ ∈ Π obtained recursively from the basic type e1. Intuitively, an opaque
predicate is an unary opaque relation of type τ = 〈e1〉. Semantically, to an opaque
predicate is associated a subquasi-set of the pure quasi-set m. In other words, the
extension of such a predicate is a collection of objects for which there is no sense
in saying that they are equal or distinct, and this is in conformity with the above
mentioned examples from quantum mechanics. So, the semantics of our logic agrees
with its syntatic aspects.
Such pure quasi-sets, let us remark, seem to be concealed by a kind of veil, since
although they have a well-determined neighbourhood (the membership relation has
a standard behaviour),12 we definitely cannot distinguish between their elements.
Furthermore, the ‘unobservability permutation theorem’ mentioned above can be
understood as saying that if an element of one of these quasi-sets is exchanged
11The concepts mentioned here are like the standard ones.
12That is, their characteristic function is a (quasi)function from the quasi-set in {0, 1}, as in
usual set-theory, what this intuitively means that, for every x, x belongs or does not belong to the
quasi-set. So, the present case is distinct from that involving fuzzy sets or quasets (concerning
the latter, see [13].
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by an indistinguishable one, all happens (to us, who are behind the veil) as if
nothing had occurred at all.13 Such quasi-sets could be called veiled sets , and are
the ‘natural’ extensions of opaque predicates. Furthermore, in accordance with
quantum mechanics, indistinguishable m-atoms are not like objects (individuals)
which merely cannot be identified; there is a strong ‘ontic’ indeterminacy among
them [16].
Before ending the paper, let us comment briefly about a peculiarity of our logic
Lop. We have choosen such a logic as ‘the’ logic of opaque predicates on the grounds
of formalizing the intuitive idea that opaque predicates should be characterized as
describing properties for which it is not possible to distinguish between the elements
that have the property ascribed by the predicate. Of course it would be incorrect
to suggest that Lop is the only logic of such predicates. Notwithstanding this,
someone could ask us why we didn’t use classical logic instead of Lop but in such
a way that its semantics is represented in quasi-set theory. Then, he/she could
say, it should be sufficient to interpret some predicates of the language as veiled
sets and the idea of opaque predicates could be achieved. This of course is an
interesting idea which could simplify much of the above discussion. But, although
we agree with the convenience of using classical logic when possible, in this case
we would have no syntactical means of distinguishing opaque predicates from other
predicates: only a ‘semantical’ distinction would be provided by using veiled sets as
the extensions of some predicates, while to the remaining ones standard sets should
be used instead. But we think that we could try to obtain a logical system which
provides also a syntactical distinction between the predicates, and our logic may
be viewed as an attempt in this direction. In fact, our system provides not only a
distinction among predicates of its language, but by postulating that the concept of
identity is meaningless for certain entities, it is still in accordance with the intuitive
idea of characterizing opaque predicates. So, returning to Peirce’s characterisation,
perhaps we can say the following: A proposition is opaque when there are possible
states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been
contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed
by the proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence
of any ignorance of the interpreter, or any indeterminacy in the speaker’s habits of
language but because of a fundamental ontological indeterminacy with regard to
the objects denoted.
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